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THE OREGON MEDICAID
PROGRAM: IS IT JUST?
Maxwell J. Mehiman, J.D. t
I. THE OREGON PLAN
IN 1989, THE OREGON legislature enacted Senate Bill 27,1
which changed the state's Medicaid program by expanding the
group of persons eligible to receive benefits under the program.2 At
the time the measure was passed, only approximately 160,000 of the
300,000 Oregonians living below the Federal Poverty Level (FPL)
- that is, earning less than $9,890 per year for a family of three3
were eligible to receive care under the state's Medicaid program.4
The intent of the legislature was to expand the program to provide
health care at least to all Oregonians whose incomes were below the
FPL.5
How is the expansion of the program to be financed? There are
a limited number of alternatives. One is to increase program fund-
ing, presumably by increasing state taxes.6 However, Oregon has
t Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve
University School of Law. B.A., Reed College (1970); B.A., Oxford University (1972); J.D.,
Yale Law School (1975). The author wishes to thank Susan Gornik and Randy Wilcox for
their research assistance, Diane Lund, Louise McKinney, Lynn Reed and Terry Rogers for
their help in sorting out the Oregon Medicaid program, June Sliker for her help with the
manuscript and my colleagues on the faculty for their helpful suggestions.
1. Codified within OR. REV. STAT. §§ 414.025 - 414.750 (1989).
2. The legislature also enacted two related pieces of legislation, Senate Bill 935 (codi-
fied within OR. REV. STAT. §§ 316.096, 317.113, 353.725, 353.765, 353.775 (1989), which,
beginning in 1994, requires employers to make contributions to a state insurance pool to fund
basic health care for employees, and Senate Bill 534 (codified within OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 735.605 - 735.650 (1989), which establishes an insurance pool, to be funded by insurance
companies, to help cover the costs of care for the uninsured. The provisions of Senate Bill 27
are more controversial and will be the focus of this paper.
3. Personal communication from Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington,
D.C. (April 16, 1990).
4. HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITrEE OREGON HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1989
SESSION, STAFF MEASURE SUMMARY at 1 (June 16, 1989).
5. Id.
6. Additional funds might be sought from the federal government, but since the federal
government only funds a portion of the costs of the program, the state would have to come up
with additional funds of its own.
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been hit with a taxpayer revolt,7 so this alternative is not politically
attractive. A second alternative is to reduce payments to providers
of care to Medicaid patients. But providers in Oregon already were
complaining that their levels of reimbursement were too low, and
Medicaid recipients would be unable to obtain access to care if
providers were driven away by inadequate compensation.8 This
seems to leave only one alternative: lowering Medicaid expendi-
tures by limiting the medical services that Medicaid would pay for.9
Senate Bill 27 adopts this rationing approach. The bill requires
the state to contract with prepaid, managed care organizations -
i.e. health maintenance organizations - to deliver care to Medicaid
recipients.10 To determine how much these organizations would re-
ceive for each Medicaid eligible they enroll, the legislature identifies
the services they must provide, and estimates how much these serv-
ices should cost per enrollee. This enables the legislature to vary
the total cost of the state's Medicaid program by expanding or con-
tracting the services that are covered. Senate Bill 27 authorizes a
Health Services Commission 1 to determine which services to cover
by ranking health services in order of priority "from the most im-
portant to the least important." 2 In addition, an independent actu-
ary determines how much the state must pay to cover the providers'
costs, and estimates the number of persons who will be enrolled in
7. See Welch and Larson, Sounding Board. Dealing with Limited Resources; The Ore-
gon Decision to Curtail Funding for Organ Transplantation, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 171
(1988).
8. The President of the Oregon State Senate, John Kitzhaber, stated, for example:
Money can also be saved for the state by cutting provider reimbursement rates. In
Oregon, the average provider reimbursement reflects a 55% discount. And while
this may help balance the budget in the short run, there are two other consequences.
First, a growing number of providers are refusing to see Medicaid recipients, further
aggravating the problems of access. Second, those who do continue to treat the
poor, often shift the uncompensated cost to employers, driving up their premiums.
See Kitzhaber, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act 5 (1989) (unpublished report).
9. Another approach would be to reduce the demand for Medicaid services by improv-
ing the health status of Medicaid recipients, such as by providing more preventive care. Since
the benefit of preventive care is not immediately realized, however, this would not solve the
budget problem in the short run.
10. See Senate Bill 27, see. 6 (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. § 414.725). The state is au-
thorized to pay providers on a fee-for-service basis in those areas in which prepaid, managed
care is not available. See See. 6(1) (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. § 414.725(1)).
11. The Health Services Commission consists of 11 members appointed by the governor
and confirmed by the state senate, comprising 5 physicians, 4 consumers, a public health
nurse and a social services worker. Senate Bill 27, sec. 4(l) (enacted as OR. REV. STAT.
414.715(l)).
12. Senate Bill 27, sec. 4a(3) (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. § 414.720(3)). The statute also
states that the ranking should represent "the comparative benefits of each service to the entire
population to be served." Id.
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the program.13 The legislature then decides which services the pro-
gram will cover during the next budget cycle'4 by comparing the
commission's priority ranking with how much the legislature wishes
to spend. 5 The law also stipulates that, if funding for the Medicaid
program is insufficient during the budget period - either because
the legislature underestimates the number of eligibles who are en-
rolled in the program or because revenues needed to fund the pro-
gram are lower than expected - the legislature may not decrease
the amounts it contracted to pay providers, and may not decrease
the size of the eligible population; instead, it must further reduce
the services covered by Medicaid, in the order that they are
ranked.' 6
The effect of these provisions is to reduce services to the current
Medicaid recipients in order to expand the Medicaid population.
Since Oregon anticipates that the actual increase in Medicaid en-
rollees will occur in increments, 17 this will create a succession of
contractions of services over time. Each expanded group of
eligibles will be entitled to fewer services than the previous group.
The sooner a person enrolls, and the sooner the person is sick, the
greater the number of services they can receive.
While the objective of expanding the Oregon Medicaid program
is commendable, the means adopted by the Oregon legislature to
control the costs of the expansion are problematic. This paper ex-
amines the legislature's approach from a legal perspective. The first
part of the paper determines whether it is consistent with federal
and state law governing the Medicaid program. Oregon is seeking
waivers from any conflicting federal requirements,'" and since there
13. Id.
14. Oregon is on a two-year budget cycle. See Welch and Larson, supra note 7, at 171.
15. See Senate Bill 27, see. 4a(5) (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. § 414.720(5)) ("After
considering the recommendations of the Joint Legislative Committee on Health Care [which
consults with the Health Services Commission on the commission's findings], the Legislative
Assembly shall fund the report to the extent the funds are available to do so.").
16. Senate Bill 27, sec. 8 (enacted as OR. REV. STAT. § 414.735).
17. See, eg., Shostak, Briefing: The Oregon Response to the Medically Uninsured 3
(July 1989) (unpublished manuscript, Bioethics Consultations Group, Inc.) ("Not all [newly
eligible Oregonians] will find their way into the program during the current two year budget
cycle. The state believes that by the end of the two year fiscal cycle (June 1991) only 10,000
of these poor but not currently Medicaid eligible persons will be enrolled.").
18. See Lund, Oregon Plan to Rank Services Rapped as Cutting Benefits, Am. Med.
News, Feb. 16, 1990, at 3, col. 1. The state is seeking a waiver from Congress as well as from
the Department of Health and Human Services. Id. An important reason for obtaining the
waivers is so that the federal government will pay a proportion of the costs of providing
medical care to Oregonians who would not normally be eligible for federal cost sharing -
basically those who do not qualify for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or
1991]
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do not appear to be any constitutional impediments, the key ques-
tion is whether the waivers should be granted as a matter of sound
public policy. The second and third parts of the paper explore this
question in terms of the two main features of the Oregon plan: pri-
ority ranking of medical services, and redistributing Medicaid re-
sources from current to future eligibles. The final portion of the
paper considers whether alternative methods of expanding Medi-
caid eligibility would be preferable.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE OREGON PLAN
The Oregon Medicaid program is governed both by federal and
state law. At the federal level, the program is subject to the require-
ments of the U.S. Constitution, and to the provisions in the federal
statutes and regulations concerning Medicaid. At the state level,
the program is governed by the Oregon state constitution and by
state laws and regulations.
Assuming that the plan is adopted and administered using the
correct procedures, it is unlikely to run afoul of the federal or state
constitutions. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Con-
stitution does not require the government to provide health care to
its citizens if they are unable to pay for it themselves. In Maher v.
Roe, for example, the Court stated that "[t]he Constitution imposes
no obligation on the States to pay.., any of the medical expenses of
indigents." 19 In other words, there is no constitutional "right" to
health care that would prevent the Oregon or federal governments
from refusing to pay for certain services for the poor, or from refus-
ing to pay for any services whatsoever.20 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has held that the government may deny benefits to
those too poor to pay for them without denying equal protection of
the law.21
for Supplemental Security Income - and whose care would otherwise be paid for entirely
with state funds. See HEALTH CARE ACCESS, THE OREGON HEALTH STANDARD, at 9
(1990) (prepared at the direction of The Oregon State Legislature's Joint Legislative Commit-
tee on Healthcare) ("Federal Medicaid requirements may stand in the way of the Oregon
plan. Congress needs to waive eligibility barriers for single adults and childless couples living
in poverty.").
19. 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977).
20. The Oregon constitution does not contain any provisions that warrant a different
conclusion.
Ironically, the only exception to the notion that there is no right to health care is in the
case of prisoners; the Supreme Court has held that denying medical care to prisoners is cruel
and unusual punishment that violates the fifth amendment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
21. The Supreme Court has held that wealth is not a "suspect classification" and there-
[Vol. 1:175
1991] THE OREGON MEDICAID PROGRAM 179
In the absence of constitutional obstacles, the legality of the Or-
egon plan will depend on whether it is consistent with the statutory
provisions governing the Medicaid program, and if not, on whether
Congress or the Department of Health and Human Services ex-
empts the plan from the statutory requirements by granting waiv-
ers. Waivers clearly will be needed to permit the state to expand
Medicaid benefits funded in part by the federal government to per-
sons who do not meet the eligibility requirements of federal law.22
A more controversial issue is raised by the need for waivers for that
aspect of the plan that denies medically necessary care to those per-
sons who must be covered under Medicaid - the so-called "cate-
gorically needy" - so that more people can be eligible.
A number of cases have challenged the refusal of a state Medi-
caid plan to cover services that were arguably medically necessary
for Medicaid recipients. 23 These cases take as their starting point
fore differential treatment based on wealth does not trigger "strict scrutiny" by the courts.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). The only exception would be if
the government denied someone a "fundamental right," a status that the Court has refused to
extend to health care. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 18-19. For example,
the Supreme Court has held that a state can provide lower benefits to ADFC recipients than
the elderly, blind or permanently disabled without violating equal protection. Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). The Court, applying limited or "rational basis" scrutiny,
stated that, "since budgetary constraints do not allow the payment of the full standard of
need for all welfare recipients, the State may have concluded that the aged and infirm are the
least able ... to bear the hardships of an inadequate standard of living." Id. at 549. Follow-
ing this precedent, the Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit recently upheld a Pennsylvania
statute which paid welfare benefits to 18-45 year olds only three months a year instead of
twelve unless they fit into other "chronically needy" categories, while providing full annual
benefits to the remaining age groups. Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 89 (3rd Cir. 1983). The
court stated that the legislature rationally could have concluded that the age classification
was a relevant distinction that was necessary to meet the legitimate state interests of reallocat-
ing scarce welfare resources and decreasing welfare fraud. Id. at 95-96. Similarly, age classi-
fications are not suspect and are subject only to minimal scrutiny. See Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93 (1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). Oregon's
scheme might be a denial of equal protection if it denied care to other suspect classes such as
racial or ethnic groups. However, the Supreme Court has declared that there must be an
intent to discriminate; the mere fact that one racial group is disadvantaged compared to
another is not a violation of equal protection. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Div. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
22. See supra discussion at note 17.
23. Federal law specifies that states must cover certain services in order to be entitled to
federal cost-sharing for their Medicaid programs, including, for example, "inpatient hospital
services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1) (1990) (Federal Medicaid regulations define "inpatient
hospital services" as "services... that are ordinarily furnished in a hospital for the care and
treatment of inpatients." 42 C.F.R. § 442.10(a)). Other services, such as chiropractic, dental
services and now certain organ transplants, are optional: the state may choose whether or not
to pay for them. See HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION, STATE MEDICAID
MANUAL 4-203 (1988) (state "can choose to cover no organ transplant procedures, some
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Justice Powell's statement in Beal v. Doe that "serious statutory
questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded nec-
essary medical treatment from its coverage."24 Courts have invali-
dated noncoverage of liver transplants25  and transsexual
operations.26 In view of these cases, Oregon will need to obtain a
waiver from the federal government to allow it to deny necessary
services to categorically needy individuals.27
One approach for Oregon to take is to obtain the necessary
waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Section
1115 of the Social Security Act permits the Secretary to waive com-
pliance with, among other things, the requirement that state Medi-
caid plans provide mandated benefits (interpreted by the courts, as
seen earlier, to include medically necessary inpatient and other serv-
ices), in the case of any experimental, pilot or demonstration pro-
ject which, in the Secretary's judgment, is likely to assist in
promoting the objectives of the Medicaid program.28 It could be
argued that, by authorizing the legislature to deny medically neces-
sary care to Medicaid eligibles, the Oregon plan would not further
the objectives of Medicaid. The purpose of Medicaid, it might be
asserted, is not to provide minimal coverage to the largest number
types of transplants and not others, or all transplants"). In addition, Medicaid is not required
to pay for treatments that are deemed experimental. See, eg., Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d
1150, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980).
24. 432 U.S. 438, 444 (1977).
25. See Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Tex. 1987) (child); Allen v. Man-
sour, 681 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (adult); Lee v. Page, No. 86-1081, CIV-J-14
(M.D. Fla. 1986) (same). This was before the Health Care Financing Administration desig-
nated coverage of liver transplants as optional in 1988. See supra note 23.
26. Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546
(8th Cir. 1980).
27. Although Oregon's refusal in 1987 to cover certain transplants under Medicaid
sparked the controversy that led to the enactment of Senate Bill 27, federal law is now clear
that coverage of transplants is not mandatory under Medicaid. See HEALTH CARE FINANC-
ING ADMINISTRATION, STATE MEDICAID MANUAL 4-203 (1988); Ellis by Ellis v. Patterson,
859 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1988). Therefore, Oregon will not need a waiver to deny these
services. The holding in the Ellis case is premised on the legislative history of 1987 amend-
ments to Medicaid. Although the decision therefore is limited to organ transplants and other
services that Congress has limited expressly, the court's language is instructive in light of the
Oregon rationing plan:
[We think plaintiff's position that all organ transplants (including hearts and
lungs) must be covered by Medicaid is unrealistic. Surely Congress did not intend
to require the states to provide funds for exotic surgeries which, while they may be
the individual patient's only hope for survival, would also have a small chance of
success and carry an enormous price tag. Medicaid was not designed to fund risky,
unproven procedures, but to provide the largest number of necessary medical serv-
ices to the greatest number of needy people.
859 F.2d at 55.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).
[Vol. 1:175
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of persons, but, through the inducement of federal cost-sharing, to
insure that the categorically needy obtain necessary services. Con-
gress has demonstrated this intent by restricting the persons whose
care the federal government would help pay for under Medicaid to
the "categorically" and "medically" needy, knowing full well that
many other persons are unable to pay for necessary health services.
However, the courts have given the Secretary wide discretion to
grant waivers under section 1115: "The only limitation upon the
Secretary's authority under section 1115," stated the federal district
court in Crane v. Mathews, "is that he must judge the project to be
one which is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the appli-
cable title of the Act .... Congress has entrusted this judgment to
the Secretary and not to the courts ... ." Given this degree of
judicial deference to the Secretary, it is unlikely that a court would
strike down a waiver on the basis that a judgment by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services that the denial of services was neces-
sary to permit the size of the eligible population to be expanded was
arbitrary, capricious or without a rational basis.
In any event, Oregon is seeking a waiver not simply from the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, but from Congress it-
self.30 Congressional approval of the Oregon plan is not even fet-
tered by the minimal legal restraints the courts have placed on the
29. Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 539 (N.D. Ga. 1976). The court went on to
state:
Thus once a project has been approved by the Secretary, it is the function of the
courts only to determine whether his decision was arbitrary and capricious and
lacking in rational basis. [citations omitted.] That review is to be based on the
record used by the decision-maker.... Given the large degree of judgment vested
in the Secretary with respect to approval of 1115 projects, it is not for the courts to
deny the Secretary the right to approve a project merely because the Court might in
certain situations disagree with his judgment. That judgment is committed to the
Secretary and must be sustained as long as he exercises it within the confines of the
statute. And, as the case law shows, the only prerequisite to the exercise of that
authority is that in the Secretary's judgment the demonstration or experiment fur-
thers the objectives of the appropriate title of the Act, in this case Title XIX [Medi-
caid]. Id.
The court's interpretation of the provisions of section 1115 of the Social Security Act are also
consistent with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, which permits ad-
versely affected persons to challenge the substance (as opposed to the procedures) of adminis-
trative action only on the basis that it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1990).
30. while this arguably demonstrates the degree to which the Oregon plan is incompati-
ble with the objectives of Medicaid, a congressional waiver probably is being sought to avoid
political pressure being placed on the executive branch to deny a section 1115 waiver. See
Lund, supra note 17, at 45 ("HCFA [the Health Care Financing Administration within the
Department of Health and Human Services] can approve the waivers without Congress' per-
mission, said Sidney Trieger, who directs the agency's [HCFA's] division of health systems.
'Given a proposal of this sensitivity, it doesn't hurt to have Congress show its supporL' If
1991]
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Secretary's discretion to grant waivers. Congress established Medi-
caid and Congress can change it or even abolish it; its action is law-
ful so long as it is constitutional, and as discussed above, there does
not seem to be any constitutional impediment to the Oregon plan.
From a legal perspective, therefore, the main question is not
whether the Oregon plan is lawful in any narrow, technical sense.
Rather, the question is whether the tools of legal analysis shed any
light on whether Congress and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services should approve the plan as being consistent with sound
public policy.
To answer this question, two issues must be addressed: First,
what are the costs and benefits of the Oregon plan? Second, is it
fair?
III. COSTS AND BENEFITS
Philosophically, the Oregon plan is premised on the utilitarian
principle of the greatest good for the greatest number.31 This in
itself is troubling, since strict utilitarianism has never been an ac-
ceptable basis for public decision-making in our society.32 Instead,
the Constitution and the laws flowing from it recognize a panoply of
individual rights which may not be compromised merely to provide
benefits to the majority. A state could not actively kill a severely ill
Medicaid recipient against his or her will even though doing so
would free up substantial resources for more profitable use by
others. By the same token, it may be impossible to justify depriving
a Medicaid recipient of a medical resource needed to save his or her
life merely in order to provide basic medical services to others.33
Oregon tries to bypass Congress, Gore says that he will introduce legislation barring HCFA
from unilaterally approving the waivers").
31. See Golenski, A Report on the Oregon Medicaid Priority Setting Project 7 (Mar.
1990) (unpublished paper) ("Both efficiency and equity should be considered in allocating
health care resources. Efficiency means that the greatest amount of appropriate and effective
health benefits for the greatest number of persons are provided with a given amount of
money. Equity means that all persons have an equal opportunity to receive available health
services.").
32. Even the court in Ellis which refused to require states to fund transplants under
Medicaid on the ground that the program was intended "to provide the largest number of
necessary medical services to the greatest number of needy people," would only permit utili-
tarian objectives to override the provision of "risky, unproven procedures." 859 F.2d at 55.
33. Even though the Supreme Court has refused to recognize a right to health care, it
might nevertheless hold that the fundamental interest in one's own life precluded a state from
depriving a Medicaid recipient of a life-saving medical resource without a compelling state
interest, and that expanding the population of Medicaid eligibles without increasing taxes or
reducing provider reimbursement was an insufficient justification. See Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618, 632-33 (1969) (fiscal considerations ordinarily are not sufficient to sustain a
[Vol. 1:175
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Assuming that the utilitarian approach is a defensible one, how-
ever, the acceptability of the Oregon plan depends on whether the
benefits of the plan - in particular, expanding eligibility for Medi-
caid - outweigh the costs of denying payment for certain medical
services for those presently eligible. A specific answer to this ques-
tion depends on what types of care will be withheld from how
many, and on what services will be extended and to how many.
This is not easy to determine, since the details of the plan are still
being worked out. As of this writing, the Health Services Commis-
sion has not yet issued its priority list of medical services; nor has
the legislature decided at what point on that list it will draw the
line. For the most part, therefore, the present inquiry must be con-
tent with examining the process by which these decisions are to be
made.
In essence, the Oregon plan will establish a cost/benefit ratio for
each health care service, and will rank services in order of most to
least net benefit.3 4 The guiding principle for ranking services is util-
itarian: services will be ranked higher if they provide greater benefit
for greater numbers of people.3" The benefits of the various services
will be calculated using a formula that considers the duration of the
benefit, the probability that the benefit will occur, and the relative
importance of the benefit as indicated by public hearings, commu-
nity meetings, telephone surveys and the collective judgment of the
Health Services Commission.36 Costs are regarded as the costs of
treatment.
3 7
If this process accurately measured the costs and benefits of var-
suspect classification); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 716-17 n.2 (1976) (Brennan, L, dissent-
ing) ("there is simply no way in which the Court... could declare that the loss of a person's
life is not an interest cognizable within the 'life' portion of the Due Process Clause.").
34. See Oregon Health Services Commission, Preliminary Report, Exhibit 5 (March 1,
1990) (unpublished report) [hereinafter OHSC Preliminary Report] ("The result is a net ben-
efit value for each condition-treatment pair. Hundreds of condition-treatment pairs will be
arrayed from the most important to the least important (the most negative numeric value to
the most positive numeric value, respectively).").
35. One utilitarian dilemma is how to compare a service that yields a large amount of
benefit to a small number of people with a service that yields a small amount of benefit to a
large number of people. The Health Services Commission apparently will treat the benefit
from these services as equivalent. See id. at Appendix 5 ("The efficiency of each condi-
tion/treatment pair is determined by the duration of its described outcomes. The Commis-
sion decided on this approach rather than directly taking into account the number who may
benefit from a treatment. In this way, if the incidence of a condition is rare but the opportu-
nity to correct it is high, a person will not be denied treatment on the basis of having an
unusual condition.").
36. See id. at 10-11.
37. See id. at 11.
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ious services, the rank ordering that it produced might be an accept-
able starting point for deciding which resources to fund. However,
the rankings will not represent a true measure of the benefits and
costs of medical services for actual patients. Instead, it will reflect at
most the views of generally healthy people toward hypothetical, fu-
ture situations.3" In this sense, the rankings resemble the purchase
of accident insurance; they no more reflect the benefits and costs of
health services than how much I choose to pay for insurance reflects
the actual costs of the future accidents I may have.39 The hypothet-
ical nature of the opinions upon which the rankings are based is
reinforced by the fact that, by and large, the opinions are those of
people who are not Medicaid recipients and who probably do not
expect ever to be in the situations they were evaluating.
Another reason for questioning the accuracy of the rankings is
that a collective judgment about the value of different services does
not reflect their value to the Medicaid recipient who is being forced
to forego the services, any more than a physician's views on what
treatment would be best for the patient necessarily reflects what the
patient would choose for himself." The Oregon approach thus runs
counter to the well-established principle of informed consent, which
holds that only the patient's own choices can reflect the value of
alternative services.4 The premise that choices can be made collec-
tively for an individual also contradicts market theory, which holds
38. The questionnaires on which the rankings are based stress the hypothetical nature of
the responses. The telephone interviewers, for example, instruct respondents to "assume you
would have no other problems than the ones described," and ask them to rate "health situa-
tions" like the following on a score from 0 to 100: "You can go anywhere and have no
limitations on physical or other activity, but have a bad burn over large areas of your body."
Id. at 1, 3.
39. The rankings are even less accurate than the purchase of insurance for purposes of
valuing health services, since ranking does not involve actual payment by those doing the
ranking.
40. This problem arises in connection with any decision about what services to cover
that is not made by the actual patient, such as the determination by Congress that Medicaid
will not cover services such as abortions. It also is characteristic of other methods for suppos-
edly comparing the costs and benefits of health services, such as the use of "quality-adjusted
life years" or "QALYs." See, e-g, K. WARNER AND B. LUCE, COST BENEFIT AND COST-
EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS IN HEALTH CARE: PRINCIPLES AND POTENTIAL 148 (1982). For
this reason, some commentators stress the need to allow individuals to decide which services
or benefit plans to purchase for themselves. See, eg., A. EINTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN 138
(1980).
41. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The only concession
to patient autonomy in the Oregon plan is the recognition that patients should be allowed to
choose between "available alternative treatments," and even this is limited by the require-
ment that these choices be made "in consultation with health planners." See Golenski, supra
note 31, at 7.
[Vol. 1:175
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that efficient outcomes can only result from individual, utility-maxi-
mizing decisions.
Even though, to the extent they are based on public opinion, the
rankings reflect neither the actual costs and benefits of services, nor
the preferences of the actual patients, this would not be so much of
a problem if the process did not introduce systematic biases into the
results. For one thing, members of the public whose views were
solicited were probably aware that their responses would help to
decide what services the state should provide to welfare recipients at
taxpayers' expense.42 Their opinions therefore may reflect the rela-
tive costs of services rather than their relative benefits.
Furthermore, the ranking process may systematically under-
value the benefit of certain services. These include services for rare
diseases or conditions that most people would not expect to encoun-
ter themselves and therefore might not think are important. But
particularly, the process may undervalue life-saving treatments.
The legislature's decisions about costs and benefits are based on hy-
pothetical or "statistical" lives rather than on actual or "identifi-
able" lives.43 Statistical lives - faceless probabilities - in effect are
less valuable than identifiable lives - trapped miners, babies in
burning buildings, seamen on a raft, Coby Howard.' We are will-
ing to spend more to save an identifiable life because of our natural
empathy for the victim and our instinct for heroic behavior. 45 Yet
like Coby Howard, the Medicaid eligible who is denied a life-saving
42. See OHSC Preliminary Report, supra note 34, at Exhibit 3 (the community was told
that, although Senate Bill 27 "means that many more people will be served, it also means that
there may not be enough money to provide all the services that people may want. For this
reason, the law requires that health services be ranked in order of importance.").
43. See Statement of John Kitzhaber, M.D., on SB 27, before the Health Insurance and
Bio-Ethics Committee of the Oregon Senate 21-22 (undated) ("If... we can develop a list of
priorities based on health outcomes we shift the focus of the debate from the individual to
society. At that point, the debate ceases to be which individual is granted or denied which
health care service. Rather, the debate becomes which service should be funded first, second,
third, and fourth - for the entire population - within the context of limited resources.").
For a discussion of identifiable versus statistical lives, see Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1415 (1969); Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Med-
ical Care. The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U. L. RIv. 6, 21-25 (1975).
44. Coby Howard was a seven year-old leukemia patient who died after the Oregon
legislature stopped funding Medicaid bone marrow transplants in 1987. Apparently, he died
before he would have been a suitable candidate for the procedure. See Golenski, supra note
31, at 4. The fact that his death nevertheless generated a furor serves to underscore the high
cost of rationing life-saving treatments.
45. Blumstein says that, in paying more to save an identifiable than a statistical life, we
are succumbing to institutional blackmail. See Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Gov-
ernment Decisions Affecting Human Life and Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1976, at 231, 252-253. One wonders how he would account for such phenomena as love and
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resource is an actual person who is identifiable to his family and
friends, typically to one or more physicians or provider institutions,
and perhaps to the public through the news media. By making ra-
tioning decisions on the basis of cheaper statistical lives, the Oregon
legislature may discount the significant, albeit intangible, costs
when a preventable death occurs, and therefore may make unwar-
ranted trade-offs during the budget process.46
The risk that lifesaving treatments will be undervalued is borne
out by the preliminary ranking undertaken by the Bioethics Con-
sulting Group.47 Organ transplants for hearts, heart/lungs, livers
and bone marrow were ranked next to lowest (a rank of three on a
scale from one to ten), below smoking cessation (ranked six), foot
friendship. In any event, the aspersions he casts do not eliminate the high cost of rationing
lifesaving treatment for identifiable lives.
46. For a more complete development of this issue, see Mehlman, Rationing Expensive
Lifesaving Medical Treatments, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1. While legislators may be able to blind
themselves to the value of identifiable lives, judges cannot, if only because the actual victim of
a decision to deny health care tends to be before the court. Therefore, judicial decisions in
rationing cases are likely to be more accurate reflections of the costs and benefits of rationing.
It is instructive, therefore, that courts rarely have denied lifesaving treatment on utilitarian
grounds. In Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Texas 1987), for example, the
court rejected the state's argument that placing a $50,000 cap on funding for transplants -
which would preclude liver transplants - would make more resources available for others:
The Texas Department of Human Services opposes exceeding the $50,000 cap
claiming that there are limited funds in the Medicaid budget and that funding these
procedures diverts funds from less risky and more beneficial uses as far as total
recipients are concerned. The Court, however, notes that in a recent fiscal year only
95 of the approximately one million Medicaid patients in Texas exceeded the sum of
$50,000. Therefore, since only .000095 percent of all Texas Medicaid claims previ-
ously exceeded the sum of $50,000 annually, it would appear that exceeding the
limit in plaintiff's case would only have an extremely minimal effect, if any, on the
funds available for other recipients. As such, the Court is of the opinion that a
greater benefit is achieved in permitting funding for the transplants than in refusing
to exceed the $50,000 cap.
654 F. Supp. at 514. It is interesting that the court evidently felt that $15 million a year (95
X $50,000) was a "minimal" sum compared with the costs of allowing Medicaid recipients in
need of transplants in Texas to die. Similarly, in Todd v. Sorrell, 841 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1988),
the U.S. Court of Appeals, in reversing a lower court's refusal to order a liver transplant
under Medicaid, balanced the costs and benefits stating: "Undoubtedly the harm to the plain-
tiff would have been enormous, indeed fatal, were the injunction denied, and the harm to the
Commonwealth if granted, while it may not have been negligible, was measured only in
money and was inconsequential by comparison." 841 F.2d at 88. Indeed, even in a recent
case in which a federal appellate court interpreted the 1987 amendments to Medicaid to make
coverage of certain transplants optional, the court did not allow the 10-month old plaintiff to
die, since the state had agreed to fund the transplants after the suit had been filed. The court
even ordered the judge below to make sure that the state provided enough resources to fund
the transplants. See Ellis v. Patterson, 859 F.2d at 56.
47. See Golenski, supra note 31, at 7-9. According to Golenski, the results of this pro-
cess led the Oregon legislature to enact Senate Bill 27. Id. at 10 ("The legislature responded
to these reports by passing groundbreaking legislation.").
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care for the elderly (also ranked six) and dentures (ranked seven).
Only one service was ranked lower: cosmetic plastic surgery
(ranked at one).48 A report on the priority-setting process explains
that the ranking was based on "the very small number of individu-
als who would benefit, the low probability of individual benefit in
many cases, the poor quality of life post-procedure and the high
costs of the procedures and after-care."4 9
It is hard to find support in the scientific literature for this view
of transplant procedures. Organ transplantation is providing
thousands of people with longer lives of acceptable quality. Survival
rates for heart transplants show that between 73.9 and 81.9% of
transplant recipients are still alive after 5 years, and 73.3% are still
alive after 10 years.50 Virtually all survivors report a satisfactory
quality of life.51 Liver transplants have a one-year survival rate of
83%.52 Satisfied that the safety and efficacy of liver transplants has
been established, the Health Care Financing Administration re-
cently proposed to cover them under Medicare, at a projected cost
of $295 million.53 Advances are also being made with bone marrow
transplantation.54 Furthermore, the cost of these transplants is de-
creasing. 55 (All of this may explain Dr. Kitzhaber's recent predic-
48. See Golenski & Blum, The Oregon Medicaid Priority-Setting Project 12-16 (March
30, 1989) [hereinafter Priority Setting Report].
49. Id. at 15-16.
50. Heck, Shumway & Kaye, The Registry of the International Society for Heart Trans-
plantation: Sixth Official Report - 1989, 8 J. HEART TRANSPLANTATION 271, 272, 275
(1989). Heart/lung transplants have a five-year survival rate of 55.4%. Id. at 276.
51. See Meister, McAleer, Meister, Riley & Copeland, Returning to Work After Heart
Transplantation, 5 J. HEART TRANSPLANTATION 154 (1986).
52. Eid, Steften, Sterioff, Porayko, Gross, Weisner & Krom, Long Term Outcome After
Liver Transplantation, 21 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2409 (1989). In another study,
all recipients reported a better quality of life and 90% reported only minor job problems 1
year after transplantation. Pennington, Quality of Life Following Liver Transplantation, 21
TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 3514 (1989). Children who have received liver trans-
plants have a one year survival rate of 69-83% and all school-aged survivors were in school
with only a "no-contact-sports" restriction. Andrews, Wanek,, Fyock, Gray and Benser,
Pediatric Liver Transplantation: A Three-Year Experience, 24 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY 77, 82
(1989).
53. 55 Fed. Reg. 8552 (March 8, 1990).
54. The International Bone Marrow Transplant Registry reports that bone marrow
transplants are increasing by 11% per year, and that victims of certain types of cancers have
a 5-year, disease-free survival rate of between 40 and 60%. Bortin & Rimm, Increasing Utili-
zation of Bone Marrow Transplantation, 48 TRANSPLANTATION 453, 455-56 (1989).
55. A recent study found that the cost of a heart transplant at one hospital declined
from $63,935 in 1984 to $33,276 in 1987. Saywell, Woods, Halbrook, Jay, Nyhuis &
Lohrman, Cost Analysis of Heart Transplantation from the Day of Operation to the Day of
Discharge, 8 J. HEART TRANSPLANTATION 244, 247 (1989). Use of a new immunosuppres-
sive drug, FK 506, reduced liver transplant costs from $244,863 to $134,169. See Staschak,
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tion that the legislature will decide to fund at least some of these
transplants. 56)
The potentially unwarranted denial of lifesaving treatments is
not the only cost of the Oregon plan. The categorically needy will
lose their statutory entitlement to whatever other medically neces-
sary services the legislature refuses to fund in order to increase the
number of eligibles.5 7 In addition, all Medicaid recipients will lose
a number of common law rights. Senate Bill 27 provides that "any
health care provider or plan contracting to provide services to the
eligible population under this Act shall not be subject to criminal
prosecution, civil liability or professional disciplinary action for fail-
ing to provide a service which the Legislative Assembly has not
funded or has eliminated from its funding pursuant to section 8 of
this Act [the provision establishing the ranking and rationing pro-
cess]."58 This eliminates the legal responsibility of physicians and
other health care providers to ensure that their patients receive rea-
sonable health care services. Absent the exculpatory provision in
the bill, providers who refused to furnish their patients with medi-
cally necessary services merely because the state refused to pay for
the services could be liable for the tort of abandonment and for mal-
practice. 9 Providers also have a legal obligation to inform patients
of the risks and benefits of alternatives and to obtain the patient's
informed consent to treatment.' ° Senate Bill 27 may protect a pro-
vider who fails to inform a patient that there is a service that the
patient needs but that the provider is not supplying because it is not
covered under Medicaid.61
Wagner, Block, Van Thiel, Jain, Fung, Todo & Starzl, A Cost Comparison of Liver Transplan-
tation with FK 506 or CyA as the Primary Immunosuppressive Agent, 22 TRANSPLANTATION
PROCEEDINGs 47, 49 (1990).
56. Am. Med. News, March 16, 1990, at p. 20, col. 4.
57. See supra discussion at notes 9-15, and accompanying text.
58. Senate Bill 27, sec. 10 (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 414.745).
59. See Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N.Y. 389, 34 N.E.2d 367 (1941) (hos-
pital liable for injuries to plaintiff after discharging him prematurely due to his inability to
pay); Becker v. Jaminski, 15 N.Y.S. 675 (1891) (jury instructed that physician owes indigent
and wealthy patients same degree of care); Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937)
(complaint against physician who refused to continue treatment of patient who could not pay
old bills). See also Wickline v. State of California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661, 183 Cal. App. 3d 1064
(1986), holding that the physician is responsible for insuring adequate patient care despite
cost constraints imposed by third-party payers.
60. See Canterbury v. Spence, 444 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
61. The bill contains a provision that requires the provider to inform the Medicaid re-
cipient "of any service that is medically necessary but not covered under the contract [with
the state] if an ordinarily careful practitioner in the same or similar community would do so
under the same or similar circumstances." Senate Bill 27, sec. 6(7) (codified at OR. REV.
STAT. § 414.725(7). Since the Oregon plan is unique, it is impossible to know what another
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The costs of the Oregon plan, however, must be weighed against
its benefits. By spending less on current eligibles, funding will be
available to extend coverage to more people. Senate Bill 27 expands
eligibility to all persons whose incomes are below the federal pov-
erty level. Although this potentially comprises 138,000 people,62
only 10,000 are expected to enroll in the program by the end of the
first budget cycle.63 Furthermore, unless the legislature drastically
cuts services the savings may not be significant. Estimates on how
much money was saved by withdrawing funding from transplants
during the 1987-1989 budget cycle range between $550,000 and
$1.1 million a year." The larger estimate is less than one per cent
of Oregon's Medicaid expenditures as projected for fiscal year 1990-
1991.65
Expanding the population entitled to receive services under
Medicaid is not the only benefit from Senate Bill 27. It will also
increase payments to providers of care,66 and will prevent their re-
imbursement from being reduced if the program costs more than
the legislature originally estimates.67 For example, it has been esti-
mated that the higher reimbursement rates will provide an addi-
tional $1.4 million in payments to providers during the first year of
the program.6 The increase in provider reimbursement arguably
provider would tell a patientin the same situation, and therefore impossible to predict how
this provision will be interpreted.
62. See Golenski, supra note 31, at 2-3 ("Given Oregon's Medicaid eligibility restric-
tions, of the 300,000 residents living at or below the Federal Poverty Level, only 162,000
qualify for Medicaid").
63. See Shostak, supra note 17, at 3; OREGoN ASSOCIATION OF HOSPITALS, RATIONING
AND MANDATES, in CAPITOL COMMENTS: 1989 LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES 1 (undated)
("... officials anticipate approximately 10,200 new enrollees the first year").
64. See Welch and Larson, supra note 7, at 171 (Oregon Division of Adult and Family
Services estimated transplant costs during 1987-1989 of $2.2 million), 172 (giving Craig Ir-
win's estimate that the state would have spent only $1.1 million on transplants during 1987-
1989).
65. See Shostak, supra note 17, at 3 (projecting $174 million available to spend during
1990-1991).
66. See Lund, supra note 18, at 45 ("the program anticipates raising the fees paid to
physicians and hospitals.. ."). See also OREGON ASSOCIATION OF HOSPITALS, supra note
63, at 2 ("We anticipate that... those providers who contract to provide services will be
adequately reimbursed"; "[tihe concepts embodied in this legislation are dependent upon re-
moving the current financial disincentive to provide care...").
67. See Senate Bill 27, sec. 8(1)(b) (codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 414.735(l)(b)) ("If
insufficient resources are available during a contract period... [tihe reimbursement rate for
providers and plans established under the contractual agreement shall not be reduced.").
68. This is based on projections by Shostak that HMO contracts would increase from
approximately $90 per enrollee per month to $102. See Shostak, supra note 17, at 4.
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will increase access for Medicaid recipients, and enhance the quality
of the providers willing to treat them.
Senate Bill 27 also is intended to help hold the line on tax in-
creases and other methods of increasing the funds available for
Medicaid. As Dr. Kitzhaber notes:
The first reality is that our resources are limited. This is particu-
larly true in our state where we have not only a constitutional
requirement to live within a balanced budget, but an expenditure
limitation and a revenue limitation as well.... We are acutely
aware that there is a limit to the level of taxation that the public
will tolerate.... When money is spent on one set of services it is,
by definition, not available to spend on other services. Health
care services must compete with all the other legitimate services
state government must provide. 69
By withholding payment for services that rank low on the priority
list, Senate Bill 27 enables the state to limit the funds needed to pay
for its expanded Medicaid program by controlling how much it
spends.
A final potential benefit is that the Oregon plan creates a mecha-
nism that makes rationing decisions public. This forces the legisla-
ture and the public to confront the hard choices before them, rather
than allowing them to be made by default or by individual health
care providers in a manner that shields them from public view. In
fact, some people believe that the prospect of rationing will prompt
the legislature to increase funding for Medicaid rather than to cut
necessary services.7 ° On the other hand, Oregonians are reported to
be extremely reluctant to increase taxes to pay for greater cover-
age,71 and their political leaders seem unwilling to try to change
their minds. 72 Indeed, the legislature's decision to halt funding for
transplants in 1987 suggests that the state will allow people to die
69. Statement of John Kitzhaber, M.D., supra note 43, at 13.
70. See, e-g., Meyer, Rationing Questions Loom with Oregon Plan, Am. Med. News,
Aug. 25, 1989, at 10, col. 2 (statement by chairman of Oregon Health Services Commission
that "[p]eople are worried that the legislature may be inclined to spend less after looking at
the list. But I think they might spend more because they'll see that the list of what's covered
will be short if they appropriate $1 million and pretty long if they appropriate $500
million.").
71. See, eg., Robinson, Who Should Receive Medical Aid?, PARADE, May 28, 1989.
(93% of those Oregonians polled said that every American has a right to health care, but "the
majority voted overwhelmingly against any increase in taxes to pay for it").
72. The degree of Dr. Kitzhaber's interest in increasing funding for Medicaid may be
indicated by his statement that "[flunding more services may require raising taxes or taking
money out of the schools." Meyer, Oregon Medicaid Plan Gets Boost from Health Care Exec-
utives' Poll, Am. Med. News, March 16, 1990, at 20, col. 4.
[Vol. 1:175
THE OREGON MEDICAID PROGRAM
rather than come up with increased funding for expensive life-sav-
ing services.
Will the benefits that can be expected from the Oregon plan -
expanded eligibility, increased payments to providers, fiscal conser-
vatism and public rather than private decisions on rationing - out-
weigh the costs in terms of medically necessary services withheld,
legal rights forfeited, and lives lost in a spectacle of public indiffer-
ence? The answer is not clear-cut. More fundamentally, it is not
evident how the benefits can actually be compared with the costs.
How does one value a life,73 or the requirement that rationing deci-
sions be made publicly? Insofar as the Oregon plan is designed to
make these trade-offs based on these factors, it may end up making
rationing decisions in a largely arbitrary fashion.
IV. FAIRNESS
Even if the costs of the Oregon plan do not outweigh the bene-
fits, the plan may be objectionable on the grounds of fairness. It is a
zero sum game; in order to expand the number of eligibles, someone
else must give something up. As noted at the outset, what is given
up could be revenues to providers or the income of taxpayers. But
under Senate Bill 27 it is the scope of covered services.74 To deter-
mine if the plan is fair, therefore, the first question that must be
asked is: who wins, and who loses?
The primary losers under the Oregon plan are those persons
who were eligible for Medicaid before the enactment of Senate Bill
27. Generally speaking, these are the poorest people in the state.
They comprise persons who qualify for Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (principally single parents and their children).7 5
Most of these families have incomes below 58% of the federal pov-
erty level. Some, the so-called "medically needy" have incomes
above this threshold but would drop below it if they had to pay
73. For a discussion of the possibilities, see MehIman, Health Care Cost Containment
and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 778, 791-99
(1986).
74. See supra discussion at notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
75. Prior to the passage of Senate Bill 27, Oregon's Medicaid program also covered the
other major group mandated as categorically needy under federal law, those persons who
qualify for Supplemental Security Income - primarily the aged, blind and disabled. Senate
Bill 27 expressly exempts them from its rationing scheme. See Senate Bill 27, see. 3(2) (codi-
fied at OR. Rsv. STAT. 414.710(3)); Kosterlitz, Oregon Wants a Little Medicaid Slack, 21
NAT'L J. 2766 (1989) ("Also viewed suspiciously by [Congressman] Waxman's staff is the
fact that the state's plan would exempt the elderly and disabled medicaid [sic] recipients, who
are represented by powerful lobbies"). Section 3(2) of the bill also exempts long-term care
from the prioritization process.
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their medical bills. In addition, some persons are eligible to receive
Medicaid benefits by virtue of receiving state general assistance or
emergency assistance.76 As the Oregon plan progresses and more
eligibles enroll, it can be expected that more services will be
dropped. Therefore, losers under the plan include each group of
eligibles whose services are cut to make way for later waves of
enrollees. 7
Who wins? The obvious winners are those Oregonians who were
not eligible for Medicaid prior to the expansion of the program in
Senate Bill 27. These are persons who would qualify for Aid to
Families with Dependent Children except that their incomes, while
still below the federal poverty level, were above the state income
thresholds, plus childless couples and single adults who do not re-
ceive general or emergency assistance. There is no question that
these people are far from being well-off, or that they need and de-
serve access to basic medical services. What is striking, however, is
that they are by and large somewhat better off than those who were
eligible for Medicaid before the plan was adopted. That is, they are
persons whose incomes are higher, or who are employed, or who
are not dependent children.78
In essence, then, the Oregon plan shifts resources from the
worst off to those slightly better off. This alone raises doubts about
its fairness. The objection is not that the newly eligible will be cov-
ered under the program. The question instead is whether it is fair to
expand the eligibility requirements by taking medically necessary
resources away from those who are even worse off. This would
seem to violate the principle that a redistribution of resources is
unjust unless it benefits the least advantaged in society.79
However, the newly eligible are not the only persons to benefit
from the Oregon plan. The provider reimbursement provisions of
Senate Bill 27 mean that providers will not have their reimburse-
ment levels reduced in order to pay for expanded eligibility. 0 In
76. The federal government does not contribute to the costs of providing care for these
last two groups.
77. See supra discussion at note 17 and accompanying text.
78. There is undoubtedly a layer of persons just above those who were eligible to receive
Medicaid prior to the passage of Senate Bill 27 who, as a result of not being eligible, were in
fact poorer than persons who earned less but were eligible. But the expanded group of
eligibles clearly includes persons who, while still poor, have a higher standard of living than
those who previously were entitled to Medicaid.
79. See J. RAwis, A THEORY OF JUSTrcE 302 (1971).
80. See discussion at notes 66-68, supra, and accompanying text. Senate Bill 27 requires
that providers be reimbursed at "rates necessary to cover the costs of services." Senate Bill
27, sec. 4a(3) (enacted as OR. REv. STAT. 414.720(3)); Coopers & Lybrand, Oregon Medicaid
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fact, provider reimbursement will increase.81 Ironically, estimates
of the additional amount that will be paid to providers during the
first budget cycle of the new program correspond closely to the
amount that would have been spent on transplants if the legislature
had not banned coverage of them in 1987.82 Again, this is not to
say that providers do not deserve higher rates of reimbursement.
Rather, the point is that it is unfair for providers to receive the addi-
tional funds at the expense of persons who are substantially less well
off.
The final winners under the Oregon plan are taxpayers and
other funding sources for the state's Medicaid budget, if we assume
that the rationing process allows the legislature to hold the line on
tax increases to pay for expanded eligibility.83 In fact, the winners
might be defined more specifically as Oregon businesses, and partic-
ularly small businesses, since a standard alternative for funding ex-
panded eligibility or increased services is to increase business
taxes.8 4 Tax stability for those who earn enough to pay taxes, and
Prioritized Health Care System: Final Report on Capitation Methods and Methods for Defin-
ing Necessary Costs 1, 4 (March 23, 1990) (unpublished report). This contrasts with the
prior approach to dealing with increased program costs which was to decrease reimburse-
ment to providers. See, eg., Kitzhaber, supra note 8, at 5 ("Money can also be saved for the
state by cutting provider reimbursement rates. In Oregon, the average provider reimburse-
ment reflects a 55% discount"); Id. at 11 ("It would be clear to anyone who has taken a
serious look at the Medicaid program at the state level ... that when the federal government
mandates additional services on the Medicaid program, without providing adequate federal
revenues, that [sic] the states (which unlike the federal government, must operate within the
constraints of a balanced budget) are often forced to respond by changing eligibility and/or
further reducing provider reimbursement.").
81. See supra discussion at notes 66-68 and accompanying text. In contrast to the cur-
rent level of "discounted" reimbursement, the accounting firm that is designing the cost-
based payment system recommends in the case of physician fees, for example, that a panel of
providers be convened "to assist in the determination of necessary costs based on the avail-
able data considering overhead costs and an adequate salary." Coopers & Lybrand, supra
note 80, at 24.
82. Compare Welch and Larson, supra note 6, (citing Oregon Division of Adult and
Family Services estimate that transplants would have cost $1.1 million per year during the
1987-1989 cycle) with Shostak, supra note 16, (providing basis for estimate that providers will
receive an additional $1.4 million per year during the first two years of the program).
83. See supra discussion at note 69 and accompanying text.
84. See Priority Setting Report, supra note 48, at 1-2 ("Most states which are struggling
with the twin problem of uncompensated care and uninsured citizens are implementing laws
or regulations which will require employers to bear most of the increased burden of funding
services, either through taxation or mandatory health benefits"). The Oregon legislature has
in fact adopted this approach in part; Senate Bill 935 (codified within OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 316.096, 317.113, 353.725, 353.765, 353.775 (1989)), passed together with Senate Bill 27,
requires employers to provide insurance coverage to employees or dependents by 1994, or to
contribute to a state insurance fund. See OREGON HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, STAFF
MEASURE SUMMARY ON SB 935-B (May 31, 1989). Presumably the amount of employer
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enhanced competitiveness for Oregon businesses, are no doubt
worthwhile objectives, but again one must ask if it is fair to achieve
them by imposing burdens on those who are worse off.
In sum, almost without exception, Senate Bill 27 allows the bet-
ter off to benefit by stripping medically necessary resources from the
worst off. In some cases, those who benefit, such as newly eligible
persons whose incomes are only slightly higher than the state
thresholds, are better off only marginally, if at all, compared with
those who lose. In other respects, however, the approach is more
unfair. For example, by precluding or reducing tax increases for
the wealthiest taxpayers in the state, the plan takes resources from
the worst off to benefit the best off.
It is important to bear in mind that, in this sense of fairness,
when the winners are better off than the losers from the start, the
Oregon plan would be unfair even if it conferred an enormous bene-
fit on the winners and caused only a modest loss for the losers. The
degree of unfairness, of course, would vary depending on the details
of the rankings and the resulting rationing scheme. The greater the
benefit compared to the loss, the less unfair it would be. Similarly,
the more the costs of the withheld services exceeded their benefits,
the more difficult it would be to justify imposing those costs even on
the better off members of society. But the preliminary ranking gives
little comfort on these scores: the fate of those in need of trans-
plants suggests that what the losers stand to lose is not trivial, and
that, while the costs of the foregone services may be high, so in
many cases are their benefits.
V. ALTERNATIVES
Although it may make it more difficult for the craftsmen of the
Oregon plan to be sanctimonious about their endeavors, there is lit-
tle practical purpose in raising doubts about the justice of the plan
unless a better approach can be devised. Since there are only a few
variables that can be manipulated, the choices are limited.
One alternative is suggested by Arthur Caplan. "[I]t is hard to
think of a moral or religious ethic that holds that when a nation
cannot pay its doctor bills, it is the poor and only the poor who
should be denied the right to see a doctor," he writes. "It is hard to
understand how any ethicist could become involved in a scheme so
blatantly unfair as that of rationing necessary health care only for
funding would be greater if services for Medicaid eligibles were maintained at pre-Senate Bill
27 levels.
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the poor." 5 One implication of these remarks is that, if care must
be rationed because it cannot be provided to all, it should be pro-
vided to none. This is not an entirely outlandish idea: during the
dialysis rationing crisis of the 1960s, at least one hospital closed its
dialysis facility altogether rather than providing dialysis only to
those who could pay.16 Yet, short of preventing a medical resource
from being developed in the first place, it is hard to imagine how it
could be denied to everyone, including those wealthy enough to
purchase it on their own either in this country or abroad."
The discussions in Parts II and III above suggest that Oregon
should not expand Medicaid eligibility by denying medically neces-
sary services. Assuming that Oregon desires to expand eligibility,
the obvious alternatives are to increase program funding or to de-
crease provider revenues. Both of these approaches are problem-
atic. Increasing program funding means increasing taxes, and
Oregonians seem to be unwilling to do this."8 On the other hand,
decreasing provider revenues risks driving providers away from the
program. This jeopardizes access to care for Medicaid eligibles and
may reduce quality. Moreover, reducing payments disproportion-
ately affects those providers who treat large populations of Medi-
caid patients, and who therefore may be among the least well-off
providers.89 Finally, unless services are cut, some increase in pro-
gram funding seems necessary, since it is unlikely that payments to
providers could be reduced sufficiently to lower the costs of the ex-
panded program to the break-even point.
Since increasing funding seems inevitable, and arguably is pref-
erable to expanding eligibility by reducing provider reimbursement,
85. See Caplan, How Can We Deny Health Care to Poor While Others Get Face Lifts?
Los Angeles Times, April 25, 1989, at 7, col. 2.
86. See Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 620, 653 (1969).
87. See Mehlman, Aged-Based Rationing and Technological Development, 33 ST. Louis
U. L. J. 671, 673 (1989); D. Callahan, SETrING LiMrrs: MEDICAL GOALs IN AN AGING
Socsnn' 199 (1987); Mehhman, supra note 74, at 836-47 (describing methods for discourag-
ing the development and diffusion of socially undesirable medical technologies). Callahan
points out that a public attempt to outlaw medically necessary technology for everyone would
most likely spawn a black market, with socially disruptive consequences.
88. See discussion supra at notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
89. While in the past providers may have been able to increase charges to other patient
groups to make up for Medicaid payment reductions, increasingly stringent cost containment
efforts by employers and insurers reduces the availability of this alternative. See Statement of
John Kitzhaber, M.D., supra note 43 at 2-11. Caplan proposes that providers be required by
law to furnish a percentage of care for the indigent. See Caplan, supra note 85. This is
similar to the idea of reducing provider revenues, since it imposes the costs of expanding the
program solely on providers, assuming that they will be unable to pass these costs on to other
patients.
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the question is: What should be the source of the additional funds?
Part of the design of the Oregon plan is to obtain some additional
funding from the federal government. This is one of the reasons, it
will be recalled, for obtaining waivers from the federal govern-
ment.90 But even if the waivers were granted, the federal govern-
ment would provide only a portion of the additional funds that were
needed; under federal-state cost sharing, the state would still have
to come up with its share of the Medicaid budget.91
Of course, where to find the funds to provide necessary health
care services to all American citizens regardless of their ability to
pay is one of the great political issues of our time, and the precise
answer is beyond the scope of this paper. Some guidelines, how-
ever, might be considered.
While the courts have not explicitly accorded health care the
status of a right, they seem to recognize that it is a special type of
good that should not be subject solely to market forces and ordina-
rily should not be withheld because of the patient's inability to
pay.92 This is consistent with the following principle of distributive
justice: necessary health services should not be withheld merely in
order to maintain inequalities of wealth. In other words, it is more
appropriate to expand eligibility by requiring the better off to subsi-
dize the less well-off, than by requiring the less well-off to forego
necessary services. This leads to quite a different approach than
Senate Bill 27. Instead of figuring out how much the legislature has
to spend on Medicaid, and then determining which medically neces-
sary services this will pay for in order of priority, the state ought to
determine which services are medically necessary, and then figure
out how much revenue will be required to pay for them.
Several objections might be made to this approach. First,
Oregonians are unwilling to have their taxes raised, and therefore
this approach is politically unfeasible. This may be true of taxing
systems that lean too heavily on the less well-off, as demonstrated
by the demise of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988.
However, it should be possible to design a taxing scheme that is
90. See supra discussion at note 17 and accompanying text.
91. In any event, xelying on federal funds to expand coverage merely pushes the ques-
tion one step back: Where would the federal government get the funds?
92. In addition to the cases cited supra at note 59, there is the famous case of U.S. v.
Holmes, in which the court stated that drawing lots was the fairest method for deciding who
should be thrown out of an overcrowded lifeboat so that not all the passengers would drown:
"[W]e can conceive of no mode so consonant both to humanity and to justice; and the occa-
sion, we think, must be peculiar which will dispense with its exercise." 26 F. Cas. 360, 367
(E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
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sufficiently graduated to attract the necessary public support, espe-
cially if the benefits were used, in conjunction with other sources,
to fund comprehensive health insurance for all.93 Incidentally, this
would avoid placing a disproportionate burden on providers of care
- either by drastically reducing their reimbursement or by requir-
ing them to treat the poor free-of-charge. Instead, funds would be
obtained from providers just like everyone else, with those who
were in the highest income brackets paying proportionately more
than their colleagues who were less off.
A second objection is that, even with increased funding, eco-
nomic resources are finite, while new, cost-increasing medical tech-
nology will continue to be developed indefinitely.94 Initially, it
should be noted that this is a problem separate from how to provide
health care for the poor under Medicaid, since the unrestrained
growth of medical technology eventually will engulf even the re-
sources of the rich. In any event, there are two approaches to deal-
ing with this problem. The first is to attempt to discourage
technological innovation, or at least to discourage cost-increasing
innovation. Given the manner in which medical advances take
place, this is extremely difficult to accomplish directly.95 The alter-
native is to define what is "medically necessary" so that certain ex-
pensive services are not purchased. At first, this may sound like
Senate Bill 27 all over again, with the term "medically necessary"
substituted for what remains of the list of ranked services once the
legislature decides what it will pay for. Given the justice principle
described earlier, however, the inquiry is quite different: unlike the
Oregon plan, the list of "medically necessary" services would be
determined on a clinical basis96 without regard to the wealth of the
recipient, but with the knowledge that whatever graduated taxing
93. Caplan proposes a "luxury tax, which could be used to help meet the crucial health-
care needs of the poor .... "Caplan, supra note 85. A steeply graduated income tax may be
wiser economically than this type of excise tax.
94. See, eg., Aaron and Schwartz, Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us, 247
SCI. 418, 421 (1990) ("The strongest evidence that the United States will have to ration care if
it wishes to slow growth of health care spending on a sustained basis comes from the creativ-
ity of medical scientists, who continue to develop new services that promise both significant
benefits for large numbers of people and large added costs for public and private budgets.
Indeed, the flow of technological innovation shows little sign of abating and may be
accelerating.").
95. See Mehlman, supra note 74, at 799-833 (1986).
96. This would be aided by improving techniques of outcome assessment that helped to
identify clinically superior and cost-effective technologies. For a description of these tech-
niques, see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MEDICARE: A
STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE (1990).
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mechanism was adopted would be relied on to supply the funds nec-
essary to insure that the services were available to all.97 Services
could be rationed under this approach, but on the basis that - like
cosmetic face-lifts - they were not medically necessary for anyone,
including the wealthy.98 Conversely, if a service were deemed to be
medically necessary for the wealthy, the funding mechanism would
see to it that it was available to all.99
VI. CONCLUSION
In their discussion of the Oregon legislature's 1987 decision to
halt Medicaid funding for transplants, Welch and Larson state that,
"[w]hatever one's views on the outcome the Oregon legislature is to
be commended for confronting such a difficult issue."1°" Whether
they are correct depends on the future of Senate Bill 27. Its fate is
in the hands of Congress and the Department of Health and Human
Services. If Oregon gets the waivers it is seeking, then Senate Bill
97. In deciding what services a state must provide under Medicaid, the courts have
interpreted "medically necessary" to mean care that is not experimental and that is "medi-
cally appropriate," and have stated that it is the primary responsibility of the patient's physi-
cian to determine what is necessary. See, e.g., Montoya v. Johnston, 654 F. Supp. 511, 513
(W.D. Tex. 1987). Other courts have focused on the fact that the treatment is the only
alternative to treat a serious or life-threatening illness. See, eg., Allen v. Mansour, 681 F.
Supp. 1232, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1986) ("This operation is the only treatment available to re-
solve his lver disease. . . "). While some of these factors would be relevant in the decision-
making process I have in mind, the individual physician's judgment would be limited by
collective clinical decisions. This might resemble the coverage policy-making process used by
Medicare, or the consensus conference approach used by the Office of Medical Applications
of Research of the National Institutes of Health. It is noteworthy that, unlike Oregon, Medi-
care has proposed to fund liver transplants. See supra discussion at note 53 and accompany-
ing text.
98. If the service were still available despite the decision that it was not medically neces-
sary, better-off persons would be able to purchase it for themselves just as they now can
purchase amenities such as private hospital rooms, or certain experimental cancer treatments.
Similarly, those better off would still be able to purchase a different quality of service, such as
an operation from a renowned surgeon, within certain quality limits established by providers,
by the government, and by the market-place. See generally, Mehlman, Assuring the Quality
of Medical Care: The Impact of Outcome Measurement and Practice Standards, 18 L. Med. &
Health Care 368 (1990).
99. Since this approach entails some form of collective decision-making to determine
what is and is not medically necessary, it is subject to the objection that it ignores the pa-
tient's personal preferences. Given the choice, for example, a person might prefer a face-lift
to a liver transplant. I see no way around this objection, except to point out that, within
broad limits, we seem willing to accept certain constraints on our decision-making autonomy.
The doctrine of informed consent, for example, does not require a physician to inform the
patient of all alternatives, but only of reasonable alternatives. See, eg., Canterbury v. Spence,
464 F.2d at 787. In any event, since this is a problem with the Oregon plan too, it is certainly
not a reason for preferring that approach to this one.
100. Welch and Larson, supra note 7, at 172.
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27 will become a beacon for other legislatures to follow,1"' and ex-
plicit, wealth-based rationing of health care will proliferate. The
poor will be the first victims, but not the last: The New York Times
reports officials in Oregon and Alameda County, California, as say-
ing that they hope the Oregon approach will "provide a model for
rationing of care for the middle class .. ." If the waivers are
denied, and rationing of necessary health services to perpetuate eco-
nomic inequalities is recognized as being morally indefensible, then
the Oregon legislature will have served us well, for in that case,
Senate Bill 27 will represent the milepost that finally makes us real-
ize that we have gone down the wrong road.
101. See Lund, supra note 18, at 46 (similar efforts underway in Colorado, Kentucky,
Alaska, Florida and California).
102. Gross, What Medical Care the Poor Can Have: Lists Are Drawn Up, New York
Times, March 26, 1989, at 1, col. 1.

